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Abstract 
There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific 
explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a 
causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the 
putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the 
counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly 
permissive theory of causal explanations. 
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1. Introduction 
No one denies that many explanations are causal. However, since Salmon (1984) and Lewis 
(1986a), not many philosophers have defended the view that all explanations are causal 
explanations. This is largely due to a host of putative counterexamples presented over the past 
decades. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow (2014) 
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has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. On this 
basis, Skow defends the view that all explanations of particular events are causal explanations, 
except for those that are what he calls in-virtue-of explanations.1 
One way to argue against Skow is to show that some genuine scientific explanation 
does not count as a causal explanation on his theory. Another way is to argue that Skow’s 
theory of causal explanations is false. I do the latter. More precisely, I argue that the theory of 
causal explanations to which Skow appeals is overly permissive – indeed, so permissive as to 
count obvious non-explanations as causal explanations. I also suggest a natural improvement 
of Skow’s theory, and argue that on this modified theory there is at least one class of 
counterexamples to the view that all explanations are causal. This serves to further 
undermine the prospects for arguing that all explanations are causal. 
 
2. Skow’s Theory of Causal Explanations 
In arguing against the putative counterexamples to the view that all explanations are causal, 
Skow does not appeal to our pre-theoretic judgments about which explanations seem causal 
and non-causal. This should not be surprising, since the putative counterexamples have so far 
struck most philosophers as involving non-causal explanation. Instead, Skow uses a particular 
                                                
1 Skow says that in-virtue-of explanations explain why some facts obtain by appealing to “deeper” 
facts that ground them. To illustrate, Skow notes that a scientist may explain why a piece of glass is 
fragile by citing its molecular structure. Such an explanation would be an in-virtue-of explanation, 
since the molecular structure grounds its fragility. (Skow 2014, 446-447) Since I will not be discussing 
in-virtue-of explanations in what follows, I will for convenience use “explanation” in a restricted sense 
as referring only to explanations that are not in-virtue-of explanations (although see footnote 8). 
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theory of causal explanation. Skow works up to his theory in stages, but it suffices for our 
purposes to examine the end-result: 
STCE: “A body of fact partially causally explains E iff it is a body of fact about what 
causes, if any, E had; or […] it is a body of fact about what it would have taken for 
some specific alternative or range of alternatives to E to have occurred instead.” 
(Skow, 2014: 449)2 
Two clarifications of this theory are in order: First, since Skow argues only that all 
explanations of particular events are causal, STCE should similarly be restricted to explanations 
in which the explanandum E is a particular event. Second, STCE is meant to allow for bodies 
of fact to partially causally explain E even when those bodies of facts merely rule out some 
possible causes of E without narrowing them down to a single cause. Thus “about” in STCE is 
understood in a broad sense in which something can be about X merely by ruling out some 
ways in which X might be. 
 To illustrate, let us see how this deals with one putative counterexample due to Nerlich 
(1979). Suppose a cloud of dust particles is moving through space. There are no forces acting 
on the particles, so they travel in “straightest” lines, i.e. along the shortest possible paths 
between their initial and final positions. But because space is curved the shape of the cloud 
keeps changing as it moves between different points in space (it might be shorter for some of 
                                                
2 As Skow indicates, the first part of this theory is very similar, if not identical, to that proposed by 
Lewis (1986a). Thus Skow’s theory is even more permissive than Lewis’s already quite permissive 
theory of causal explanations. That said, my argument against Skow (presented in section 3) is not 
only that the addition of the second part of the theory makes it too permissive, but that the first part is 
already too permissive (because it counts obvious non-explanations as partial causal explanations). So 
if my argument succeeds against Skow’s theory, it also succeeds against Lewis’s. 
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the particles to move around a bump in space, for example, rather than going over it). Nerlich 
takes this to be a counterexample to the thesis that all explanations of particular events are 
causal explanations, roughly because the curvature of space is not a cause of the cloud’s 
changing shape. In reply, Skow points out that Nerlich’s explanation “rules out all possible 
causal histories in which free particles do not travel on straightest lines but instead require 
external causes to do so.” (Skow, 2014: 451) So although Nerlich’s explanation does not 
specify a cause of the cloud’s changing shape, it does partially causally explain it in virtue of 
ruling out certain possible causal histories.3 
 It is worth noting that the view that Skow is actually defending here and elsewhere in 
his paper is considerably weaker than the view that all explanations are causal explanations. It 
is, rather, that all explanations are partial causal explanations. Indeed, as STCE makes evident, 
Skow does not even give a theory of complete causal explanations. This poses at least a prima 
facie problem for Skow since unless the stronger claim can be defended, it seems that there is 
explanatory information that is not causal. And that in turn undermines at least the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the view that all explanations are causal. However, I shall not discuss this 
problem here and instead argue that Skow has not even successfully defended the claim that 
all explanations are partially causal. 
                                                
3 One might wonder about the kind of possibility at play in Skow’s view: Need a partial causal 
explanation rule our causal histories that are physically possible or is it enough for them to rule out 
causal histories that are metaphysically, epistemically, or even just logically possible? Although Skow does 
not address this question explicitly, it is clear from his response to Nerlich’s example that ruling out 
physically possible causal histories is not required. After all, worlds in which free particles do not travel 
on straightest lines are physically impossible, so ruling out causal histories in which that happens is not 
to rule out physically possible causal histories. Thus we see that the kind of possibility in play must be 
metaphysical, epistemic, or logical possibility. 
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3. An Objection to Skow’s Theory 
This section presents an objection to Skow’s theory of causal explanations, STCE. The 
objection is based on a standard counterexample to Hempel’s (1965) DN-model of scientific 
explanations, viz. the “explanation” of a storm in terms of a barometer reading. Salmon 
describes the case as follows:  
The barometer. If a sharp drop in the reading on a properly functioning barometer 
occurs, we can infer that there will be a storm – for the sake of argument, let us assume 
that there is a law that whenever the barometric pressure drops sharply a storm will 
occur. Nevertheless, we do not want to say that the barometric reading explains the 
storm, since both the drop in barometric reading and the occurrence of the storm are 
caused by atmospheric conditions in that region. (Salmon, 1989: 47) 
The barometer is among the least controversial examples of a non-explanation in the 
literature. Now, if the barometer reading is not an explanation of the storm at all, then it is a 
fortiori not a causal explanation of the storm. Indeed, the very fact that the barometer reading 
does not seem to provide for a causal explanation is often taken to lend plausibility to the idea 
that explanations must be causal. 
 However, notice that the information that the barometer drops sharply does rule out 
certain possible causes of the storm. It rules out all those possible causes of the storm that 
would also cause that barometer to change in any other way, e.g. by rising or keeping steady. 
Thus the barometer reading is a body of fact about what causes, if any, the storm had. 
Incidentally, the “explanans” in the barometer example also includes “a body of fact about 
what it would have taken for some specific alternative or range of alternatives to E to have 
occurred instead.” This is because the “explanans” in the example includes a law governing 
the correlation between barometer readings and weather conditions, which rules out many 
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possible causal histories of the various specific alternatives to the storm. For example, it rules 
out that clear weather (a specific alternative to the storm) is caused by something that also 
causes the barometer to drop sharply.  
 It might be objected that this shows only that the barometer counts as a partial causal 
explanation on STCE. That is true, but irrelevant. The uncontroversial judgment about the 
barometer is not that the barometer reading provides only a partial explanation of the storm – 
it is that it doesn’t explain the storm at all. The barometer reading is simply not explanatorily 
relevant to the storm, so the storm is not even partially explained by it. Thus it follows that the 
barometer reading a fortiori doesn’t causally explain the storm even partially, contrary to what 
STCE entails. Hence STCE is false. 
 It might also be objected that although STCE is false, it does not matter much for 
Skow’s overall defense of the thesis that all explanations are casual. Perhaps the way in which 
Skow argues against the putative counterexamples does not rely on this part of his theory of 
causal explanations? To see why that’s not so, consider the class of putative counterexamples 
that most of Skow’s paper is concerned with, viz. explanations that merely cite laws of nature. 
Here is an example that is closely analogous to one discussed by Skow: “That particle is 
traveling slower than light because no material thing can travel faster than (or at) the speed of 
light.” As Skow notes, this appears to be a non-causal explanation since the explanans doesn’t 
cite any causes of the particle travelling under the speed of light. Skow’s response is that the 
explanation is causal after all, because: 
The [particle] explanation cites no cause of the [particle’s] subluminal velocity, but 
does rule out causal histories in which [particles] left alone always accelerate to a 
superluminal speed and something special happened to prevent this one from doing 
so. (Skow, 2014: 455) 
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As we have seen, however, ruling out some causal histories of an event is not sufficient for 
something to count as even a partial causal explanation of that event. If that were so, then the 
barometer reading would count as a partial causal explanation of the storm. So Skow’s 
response to this case exploits the very part of his theory of causal explanations that the 
barometer explanation shows to be mistaken. Put differently, the objection here presented 
against Skow’s theory is an objection to precisely that part of the theory he uses to argue 
against an important class of putative counterexamples. 
 Now, although I have put my objection to Skow’s theory in terms of the barometer 
explanation, it should be noted that there is an abundance of information that would count as 
partially causally explanatory on STCE even though no one would ever dream of considering 
it causal explanatory. For example, the fact that I am having coffee right now rules out certain 
causal histories of the fact that I am sitting in front of a computer, viz. those causal histories in 
which the causes of me sitting down also cause me not to have coffee. Yet I clearly have not 
even partially causally explained why I am sitting in front of a computer by citing the fact that 
I am having coffee. The general point here is that something may rule out causal histories, 
either of the explanandum event or of the specific alternatives to that event (or both, as in the 
barometer example), without causally explaining the event even partially. Causal 
explanations, even when merely partial, must do more than rule out causal histories. 
 
4. A Modest Revision of Skow’s Theory 
I have argued that Skow’s theory of causal explanation is overly permissive and thus cannot be 
relied upon in a defense of the thesis that all explanations are causal. Of course, this does not 
show that Skow’s thesis is false, only that Skow’s defense of it fails. Those seeking to defend the 
thesis might respond by attempting to construct another theory of causal explanation and 
argue that this new theory counts all explanations as causal. In order for such a defense to 
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succeed, the new theory would have to be at least as plausible as alternative theories of causal 
explanation on which there are non-causal explanations. This section provides a reason for 
pessimism about this project by sketching what I take to be a plausible (but still very 
permissive) theory of causal explanation on which there are non-causal explanations. 
As a point of departure I will take Skow’s own theory of causal explanations, SKCE, 
and modify it in light of the problem identified in the previous section. Recall that the 
problem with Skow’s theory is that it counts non-explanations such as the barometer as 
(partial) causal explanations. Now, since the “explanans” in the barometer explanation does 
rule out certain causal histories of the storm, it seems that the mere ruling out of some causal 
histories of E should not count as giving even a partial causal explanation of E. The moral of 
the story is thus that merely ruling out causal histories does not by itself make some piece of 
information partially causally explanatory. However, it is also clear that a partial causal 
explanation of E needn’t specify the entire causal history of E, so in what sense would a causal 
explanation be partial if not by merely ruling out some causal histories? 
We may begin to answer this question by considering the fact that explanations are 
answers to certain questions – what Salmon (1989) calls explanation-seeking why-questions. So what 
is it to give a partial answer to a question? If my spouse asks “What’s for dinner?”, I might 
partially answer the question by saying “Not pizza”, thereby ruling out certain possible 
dinners. Another way for me to partially answer my spouse’s question is to specify part of 
what’s for dinner, e.g. by saying “Well, there will be potatoes”. At least in certain 
conversational contexts, it will be understood that we will not merely be having potatoes for 
dinner, although potatoes will be included. The point here is that the second answer works not 
only by ruling out certain dinners (such as potato-free pizza) but also by specifying part of 
what the dinner consists in. While the first answer partly specifies what’s for dinner, the second 
answer specifies part of what’s for dinner. 
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Now, the barometer is an example in which the explanans partly specifies the causal 
history of the explanandum, for it rules out causal histories in which the storm’s cause also 
causes a rise in the barometer, for example. Yet the explanans intuitively does not specify part of 
the explanandum’s causal history, since it fails to specify any event or sequence of events in 
the storm’s causal history (or, indeed, whether the storm has a causal history at all). In sum, 
although the drop of the barometer partly specifies the storm’s causal history, it does not specify 
any part of it. This suggests that we can avoid the problem identified in the previous section by 
modifying Skow’s theory of partial causal explanations as follows: 
MTCE: A body of fact partially causally explains E iff it is a body of fact that specifies 
some part of the causal history of E; or it is a body of fact that specifies some part of 
the casual history that would have had to occur in order for some specific alternative 
or range of alternatives to E to have occurred instead. 
To clarify, MTCE counts as partially causally explanatory any specification of an event or 
sequence of events in either the actual causal history of the explanandum event or the 
counterfactual causal history of an alternative or range of alternatives to the explanandum 
event. Here, “causal history” is taken in a broad sense that includes the possibility that the lack 
of a cause at some particular point may count as a part of an event’s causal history. Thus, the 
fact that something is uncaused would count as causally explanatory on MTCE.4,5 
                                                
4  To be clear, I am not defending MTCE here as an adequate account of partially causal 
explanations. Indeed, in my view MTCE is still overly permissive since it counts information that 
specifies any part of some event’s causal history as a partial causal explanation of that event. So, if the 
Big Bang is a part of all actual causal histories, then the fact that the Big Bang happened counts as a 
partial causal explanation of all actual events. Also, depending on one’s intuitions and how one 
individuates events, MTSC might also be too restrictive. To see this, consider the following case 
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(suggested to me by Brad Skow in personal communication): Suppose Jones has a black eye because 
Smith punched him in the face. It might be thought that the information that someone punched Jones 
in the face suffices to partially causally explain Jones’s black eye, and yet being punched by someone 
in the face arguably does not specify any particular cause of the black eye. (It does not specify whether 
the puncher was Smith, or Brown, or someone else.) However, if one wanted to defend MTCE, one 
could point out that the information that Jones was punched in the face by someone does specify that 
the causal history of Jones’s black eye included a punch. If one adopts criteria for individuation of 
events such that punching counts as a distinct event (over and above Smith’s punching, Brown’s punching, 
etc.) this would count as partially causally explanatory on MTCE. 
5 It should be noted that this theory does conflict with an example that Skow takes to be of a partial 
causal explanation. Skow (2014: 448) says that the fact that Huey did not throw the rock at the 
window partially causally explains why the window broke since it rules out one particular cause of the 
window breaking and narrows down the list of possible causes to Dewey and Louie (who were the only 
other people around who might have thrown a rock at it). On MTCE, this is false since the 
information that Huey did not throw the rock does not specify any event or sequence of events in the 
causal history of the breaking of the window. 
 Although I am not defending MTCE here (see previous footnote), it does seem to me that 
MTCE gets this case right (and that Skow’s original theory, STCE, gets it quite wrong). I cannot 
imagine a situation in which the piece of information that Huey did not break the window would even 
partially satisfy someone’s request for a causal explanation of the fact that the window broke. (Of 
course, someone who is interested only in what Huey did – e.g. his parents – might be satisfied with 
this information, but such a person is not requesting an explanation of the fact that the window 
broke.) That said, I acknowledge that Huey throwing the rock at the window provides some 
information about what the partial causal explanation might be – thus we could say that it is causal-
explanatory information relevant to the window breaking. But this is also true of the “explanans” in 
the barometer example, and so that cannot make Huey’s non-throw into a partial causal explanation. 
An anonymous reviewer points out that given the background knowledge that Huey, Dewey 
or Louie broke the window, the proposition that Louie broke the window is equivalent to the 
conjunctive proposition that neither Huey nor Dewey broke the window. So suppose Louie broke the 
window. Since the proposition that Huey did not break the window is one conjunct in a conjunction 
that is equivalent (given background knowledge) to this proposition about the actual cause of the 
breaking of the window, the reviewer suggests that one might think that Huey not breaking the 
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While MTCE is admittedly only the beginning of a theory of causal explanations, it is 
precise enough to allow us to evaluate whether all explanations are causal on this theory. 
Consider the particle explanation from the previous section: “That particle is travelling slower 
than light because no material thing can travel faster than (or at) the speed of light.”6 The first 
thing to note about the example is that the particle travelling at the speed of light does have a 
causal history. On one possible causal history of the event, the particle just now came out of a 
particle accelerator – one that isn’t powerful enough to accelerate the particle above a certain 
speed, which is lower than that of light. On another possible causal history, the particle was 
travelling slower than the speed of light a split-second ago – and since no forces have acted on 
the particle between now and then, it’s still travelling slower than light. Both of these scenarios 
                                                                                                                                                  
window is a partial causal explanation. In response, I deny the assumption that the fact that some 
proposition is a conjunct in a conjunction that is equivalent (given background knowledge) to a 
proposition about the cause of some event suffices for the proposition to be a partial causal 
explanation of the event (although it may provide information that is of causal-explanatory relevance 
to the event). In fact, to my mind the failure of this assumption is adequately illustrated by the Huey-
Dewey-Louie example, since the information about Huey’s non-throw is intuitively not a partial 
causal explanation. For those who are not convinced by that case, here is another example: Suppose 
that victim V was murdered by suspect S. Given the background knowledge that the murder was a 
one-man job performed by a human being, this is equivalent to a proposition of the form “X1 did not 
murder V, and X2 did not murder V… and Xn did not murder V”, where {X1,…,Xn} is the set of all 
human beings except S at the time to the murder. However, the information that a random person 
did not murder V is surely not a partial causal explanation of V’s death. 
6 In what follows, I will assume (as Skow himself does implicitly) that this is not an in-virtue-of 
explanation, i.e. an explanation in which the explanans grounds the explanandum. Admittedly, the 
notion of grounding is still being worked out in the metaphysics literature, so it is unclear what exactly 
will count as an in-virtue-of explanation. (See, for example, Schaffer (2009), Rosen (2010), and Audi 
(2012).) However, I have seen no suggestion in the literature that particular events may be grounded 
in the laws that govern them in the manner required for the event that the particle travels slower than 
light to be grounded in the law that nothing travels faster than (or at) the speed of light. 
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are possible causal histories of the particle travelling under the speed of light – and they are 
contrary causal histories since they disagree vis-à-vis how things stood in the world a split-
second ago. 
Now, note that the information that no material thing can travel faster than (or at) the 
speed of light does not specify which of these possible causal histories is correct about the part 
of the actual causal history that took place a split-second ago. Thus the part of the causal 
history of the particle’s travelling slower than the speed of light that took place a split-second 
ago are not specified by the explanans. The same is clearly true of any other parts of the 
particle’s causal history, so the explanans does not specify any part of that causal history. 
Neither does the explanans specify any part of what it would have taken for some specific 
alternatives to the explanandum to have occurred instead. In this case, a specific alternative to 
the explanandum would be an event in which the particle travelled at or above the speed of 
light. To be sure, Skow is right to point out that the explanans tells us something about the 
causal histories of such events, viz. that “faster-than-light motion would have required 
different physical laws.” (Skow, 2014: 456)  However, this clearly doesn’t suffice to specify any 
part of the causal histories of the particle travelling at a given superluminal speed – at best, it 
merely rules out certain causal histories of these alternative events. 
 In sum, then, the explanans in the particle explanation neither specifies some part of 
what causes, if any, the explanandum had; nor specifies some part of what it would have taken 
for some specific alternative or range of alternatives to the explanandum to have occurred 
instead. Hence the particle explanation is not even partially causal according to MTCE. This 
further undermines Skow’s claim that all explanations are (even partially) causal, since MTCE 
is designed to be as close to STCE as possible without having the absurd consequence that the 
barometer and other uncontroversial non-explanations count as partial causal explanations. 
Of course, since MTCE is not the only possible alternative to STCE, this does not conclusively 
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show that there are non-causal explanations. However, it does show that those who seek to 
argue otherwise must not only present a theory of causal explanation on which there are no 
non-causal explanations, but also show why such a theory should be preferred to MTCE. 
Since MTCE is both plausible and still very permissive, we should be pessimistic about the 
prospects for finding such a theory. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have undermined Skow’s defense of the thesis that there are no non-causal explanations (of 
particular events, excluding in-virtue-of explanations, and where “non-causal” is understood 
as meaning not even partially causal). Skow’s defense of this thesis against putative 
counterexamples turns out to rest on a theory of partial causal explanations that I have 
argued is overly permissive. I also presented a slightly less permissive theory in the same spirit, 
and argued that one class of counterexamples still holds up on this theory. Since this modified 
theory is still quite permissive, I conclude that the prospects for arguing that all explanations 
are causal using some alternative to Skow’s theory are dim. At the very least, it is clear that a 
plausible theory of causal explanations on which all explanations of the requisite kind are 
even partially causal is yet to be found.7 
  
                                                
7 I would like to thank Michael Bertrand, Marc Lange, Bradford Skow, and two anonymous reviewers 
for this journal for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank those who 
participated in the reading group on non-causal explanations in the Spring of 2014 at the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for valuable discussions on these issues. 
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